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Philosophy

General Essays

Logic **George Orwell was.....?**

Introduction

This essay considers the proposition that it is possible to have proper names that do more than denote and refer but it concludes that this denotation and inference is not contained within the name itself nor, in the first instance, is it contained in that to which it refers. Accordingly it ignores or by-passes propositions which in themselves pre-suppose prior knowledge or which could distort or confuse the logical structural arguments propounded to support the contentions of this work. The acceptance of statements by and through familiarity, or as Hume might say because they are sequential and contiguous before the mind, is avoided. Accordingly no familiar names are used in the analysis of logical structures and variables and general propositions are accorded unfamiliar symbolic representation.

The following arguments are specific to Mill's fundamental proposition which appears to be universally adhered to (and seems unquestioned by subsequent logicians including Russell and Frege) namely that 'A class is the indefinite multitude of individuals denoted by a general name'. The contention of this essay is that this proposition is invalid and has led to a system of logic based upon a rigid symbolic representation of predicated nouns utilising descriptive analysis of how one 'thing' may be descriptively individuated from another.

The first great division of names made by Mill in his system of logic is that between general names and individual or singular names. By the word 'name' Mill implies a symbol or label by which we may bring before our minds 'a thought like some thought we had before'. Names have, for him, intentionality and they refer to objects with the intention of conveying information. The amount of information conveyed is, however, not dependent solely upon the number of words that constitute the name in question for in practice all mixed terms are considered to be singular in their effect. As an example 'a fortune teller' is a categorematic set of words that denote an individual entity, though not a specific one. The test to Mill for a proper name is its ability to retain only one inference when predicated thus 'A fortune teller was running to the metro' only implies a singular occurrence - it does not imply or refer to any other occurrence. 'A fortune teller' is a general categorematic term referring to an individuated entity that possesses no descriptive particularity. However 'a fortune teller and the # were....' makes two assertions and unless # and a fortune teller are one and the same then we have # and § not #§. Thus #§ v # and § were running.....'. Yet does Mill's logic admit to the possibility that two categorematic terms can be independently owned and be truly affirmed of an individual entity. Mill's line of reasoning advocates that a proper name can only be owned and truly affirmed of one thing whereas a general name can be confirmed or denied by whether or not it correctly 'describes by predication' an indefinite number of things successively. Thus to Mill classification is by description not prescription.

Accordingly people or things are individuated not by a common classification but by a descriptive definition that is specific to them - thus Brian is a delineated individual by the ownership of the name Brian and not because he belongs to a species having an infinitive

number of assignable qualities such as psychologically definable and describable features. Consequently Brian the three legged dwarf is a three legged dwarf who happens to be called Brian. A necessary and unavoidable proposition that follows from this method of reasoning is the assertion that a 'class is indefinite'. To Mill a 'class' has no prescriptive defining role in asserting who is to be classified as what - thus to him the name classifies, the classification does not. The old Forty-Niners refers to a class, yet to a class of what? There appears to be a general supposition made that one can reasonably and logically argue towards a denotation or and a connotation by some mysterious a priori inherent knowledge of what such a categorematic term refers to and how it may refer by some descriptive predication to a general, specific, collective or proper entity solely upon the basis of having been pronounced. The upshot is that a further distinction is made between connotation and denotation, this move being necessary for Mill because he uses adjectival predicated descriptive inferences to assign attributes to objects (nouns), the more defining the description the more definite the description. Thus in logical notation we go from $\forall$ to $\exists$ by assigning predicates based upon descriptive analysis of nouns. Proper names are and have informative content if and only if they truly refer to a singular describable object. By 'truly refer to' we understand this to be the same as to be truly affirmed 'of' a thing. If we are mistaken in assigning a descriptive predicate to an individual then if this error is universalised then this information can never be truly affirmed of that individual although it may well be truly affirmed of an infinite number of other things.

If MA was AB we have to have some information which can be truly affirmed of at least one of them. Now if MA is 'noted' for apple-picking (1 is an apple-picker) and AB is 'noted' for pot-holing (1 is a pot-holer) we would have MA classified by descriptive predication of her apple-picking propensities whereas AB would be classified by their underground exploits. We could truly affirm the information of apple-picking to MA but not under any descriptive analysis could we truly affirm this of AB. Note that 'MA was AB' is a proposition that is, as yet not truly affirmed. If it is truly affirmed then this conformation could not have any necessary connection to either MA or AB's descriptive predication. No matter the method of affirmation MA would be a proper name and AB would be a proper name under Mill's method thus two labels would refer to one item.

As a consequence MA has two proper names, one unique to them as an apple-picker and one unique to them as either AB or as AB the pot-holer. However if MA spent all day in suspended animation whilst AB spent all night underground linking the two together would hardly enhance the informative content of the conjunction. If one insists on using names to classify attributes instead of attributes classifying names then one ends up with the problem of attempting to assign a true identity by matching a definite description to a 'thing' and thence analysing 'the fit'.

Formal logic appears to lack any method or symbol to differentiate upon the grounds of which type of predication is being used to validate and justify a consequence to an inference. One could suggest that universal quantification is prefixed according to whether or not we begin our universe of discourse from $\forall$ to $\exists$ (say by using the symbol $\rangle$) or from $\exists$ to $\forall$ using the symbol $\langle$. Thus S, a proposition having categorematic unity and possessing a truly affirmable identity with an informative content would be classified $\langle x \forall x \exists x$, i.e. 'there is a general class of things denoted by an identifiable individuated entity and out of all of these (universe of discourse) there is one.....'. Mill and his

successors however write $\geq x \forall x \exists x$, i.e. 'There are an infinite and indefinite number of things and of all these things ($\forall x$) there is at least one ($\exists x$).....'. A natural consequence of the above is that we cannot know what people are talking about or referring to without knowing in advance into what context the existential quantifier is being used by inference. Thus to talk of MA in the context of pot-holing would be false and non-informative yet to introduce MA into a discussion upon cider-making would be true and informative. Nothing is gained by stating the conjugation MA (the apple-picker) = AB (the pot-holer) unless the discussion (universe of discourse) is subterranean cider production. However a serious objection may be raised upon the grounds that if in formal logic descriptive predication assigns true and affirmative values to proper names and that this assignation is justified on the belief that descriptive predication somehow verifies the prescriptive and universal use of names within informal and formal language then this is a contradiction of and in the terms used.

If we take the proposition S = all students read books and use existing logic forms of notation we have $(\forall x)\ (Sx \supset Bx)$. If we take a second proposition B = no students read books we have $(\forall x)\ (Sx \supset \sim Bx)$. Clearly this is a contradiction in terms for a prescriptive definition of a student is one who reads books.

However by using a descriptive definition and predication we may describe students in any manner we see fit yet no practical informative content can accrue.

One may conclude that Mill's definition of what a class is and how one definitely describes 'a class of things' by label is incorrect and that all subsequent logical analyses fail to differentiate between single and individuated things as initially belonging to a group of individuated things and thence to a class of things and finally to a classification both general and specific.

Mill wrote 'A class is the indefinite multitude of individuals denoted by a general name'. But should we not write 'an individual name denotes a class of things under a general name within an indefinite multitude of individuated and general things'. Thus Eric Blair denotes a man who possesses only what other men possess. George Orwell denotes a class of person under the general noun Author. We know no more of him if he was called Eric Blair or Shirley Andrews, that is, there is no additional informative content in a conjunction of individuated things or names by the mere fact of conjunction or for that matter whether the names are or are not synonymous. Accordingly B was B is as true and informative as B was Y or as Y was Y. The conjunction of descriptive predicates can only be of use if and only if the variables employed to analyse a specific proposition refer to descriptive predications having a specific informative content relative to the universe of discourse into which they are introduced. That is their range and scope is limited and their use only validated by their informative content. Therefore to state 'George Orwell was Eric Blair' is both true and informative and to state 'George Orwell was George Orwell' is trivial is to propound a singular proposition, that is it should, to make sense, be referred to as a categorematic term consisting of a series of conjunctions. Yet in a series of conjunctions the proposition must be true if all the conjuncts are true yet to be informative the conjuncts not only have to be true they have to have a relevant informative content.

In the class of indefinite things presupposed by Mill 'Eric Blair' has no informative content. Thus the whole proposition that George Orwell was George Orwell was Eric Blair (i.e. pq and r) is true but uninformative, that is, it is true and trivial.

References

J.S. Mill, A System of Logic - Ratiocinative & Inductive, Longmans 1965.

General Reading

M. Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy, Duckworth 1981., in particular Chap.9, Kripke on Proper Names, P.183, and Frege Definite Descriptions.

Are Simples simple?

This essay concentrates upon the views expressed by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus.

C.A. Van Peursen writing on this work in 1969 (Faber & Faber) states that the Tractatus contains seven main points, the bulk of which are concerning the relevance of symbolic logic to the meaning we can give to propositions.

This work therefore concentrates upon the dichotomy between understanding propositions according to how they are connected to and with other propositions and understanding them according to what they say in themselves.

The terms of reference that will be used are those proposed by Wittgenstein.

States of affairs must, according to him, be expressed by sentences and not by single words. The simplest atomic fact is the simple subject plus predicate proposition, e.g. the brick is hard. The pictures of reality that he wants us to compose are to be constructed of simples, i.e. atomic facts, placed upon and against a backdrop, their relativity to each other generating a true image of what they are intended to represent. If, however, we simply state what is the case, how are we to represent what is not the case without first stating what we are about to deny?

This problem would force us to state *P*. 'the brick is hard' and then ~ *P* 'the brick is soft'. Simply stating ~ *P* 'the brick is soft' without *P* would lead to ~ *P* being *P*, for we would be unable to state or infer any definite conclusion from simply *P* by itself.

If Van Peursen is to be believed then Wittgenstein's 'break through' (P.39) was to state '*p*' means the same as '~ *p*', the meaning being contained in how '*p*' v '~ *p*' refer to a state of affairs. Thus negation, 'it is the case v state of affairs that something is not what it is' is the same as the state of affairs that 'something is not what it is'.

Reality is given only by how one variable varies relative to another variable. This is pure Kant.

Variables are not absolutes. 'The glass is on the table' is a contingent atomic fact.

Ayer in his 'language, truth and logic' refers to section 3.031 of the Tractatus as upholding that the sole or only ground of anything in this world being necessary is that they are necessary by definition alone.

No matter how represented and no matter what conventions are used there is an apodictic inherent in logic and mathematics which states that the computations used by the mind must, without it being aware of an error, lead to a necessary conclusion, this necessity arising out of how the mind functions.

To put it bluntly, Wittgenstein and Ayer state, 'we have to think like this'.

Yet the question remains. Does one think of the world in terms of atomic facts or in terms of molecular facts?

Atomic facts may be taken to be 'simple' subject-predicate propositions, e.g. 'The brick is hard' whereas molecular facts may be said to contain a logical constant in addition to the predicate, e.g. 'The brick is hard + &/v is red etc'.

It is upon how these facts are displayed that this work concentrates. To assist this discussion an analogy will be made between communicating ideas by and through language and communicating ideas by and through painting, i.e. representing the world in oils and pigments.

The pigments represent atomic facts, the oils, the medium by which they are held and transferred, represent the logical constants. Combined they represent molecular facts.

The next question which arises is, 'How is one's interpretation of 'the' picture or 'a' picture going to be verified?'

Indeed, 'How many pictures are there?'

Wittgenstein believes there to be one picture - (T.I.) The World. It is subdivided into facts, atomic facts which are logically necessary in so far as ① they make sense and ② they refer to the real and only world.

An atomic fact is a proposition. The totality of these propositions is our language and these propositions refer to a state of affairs.

Each atomic fact is empirically induced from 'the' world, the totality of atomic facts producing general propositions. These general propositions form the variables within formal logic. These variables are logically a priori - nothing can exist after the fact - facts are predetermined propositions. Therefore if a fact exists (T.7) one cannot speak about it for the world is the totality of all elementary propositions. There is nothing new.

The logical relationships between ideas is given by the world. For Hume and Wittgenstein simple ideas form the raw material for human thought and they agree with Leibniz and Hobbes in that everything done by the mind is a computation - 'the addition of a sum or the subtraction of a difference' (Leibniz, Logical Papers P.3). Complex propositions (or pictures) containing many predicates (but no ostensive logical constants) are resolvable into 'simple' ideas, there being no relevance as to whether these arise directly or indirectly from or through impressions or realities.

But how or what simplifies complex molecular propositions? Do we take the atoms and throw away the connective forces? Are we to have all our logically possible simple-elementary-propositions given to us (T.451) and thus inhabit a world of predetermined possibilities of prearranged conjunctions - the totality of atomic facts limiting thought a priori so that we think only what our language decides?

Or do we follow Hume and construct 'a' world, a world that is unlimited because we can synthesise our simple ideas into an unlimited number (unlimited in the sense of unknowable a priori propositions) of complex propositions.

Wittgenstein writes that his fundamental idea is that the logical constants do not represent, i.e. are not representative of anything. Logic itself - the process - cannot (T.4.0312) be represented.

This is the crux of the matter. Thus the word 'if' for Hume and Russell proves problematical, but only if it is taken as being more than a process of connecting 'simple' ideas. What Wittgenstein is saying is that all the colours are a priori language and thought and once we use the logical connectives to place them upon the canvas of the mind these connectives fall out of the picture leaving either a true or false representation of reality.

Before analysing the Tractatus using logical constants as our terms of reference we must be sure of what we are talking about.

Logical constants represent all those symbols which are used to represent the meaning of those everyday constants used in proposing a proposition.

The sentence and a sentence are taken to be what is proposed objectified into words, the words used indicating the intended meaning of the proposition made by the proposer.

It is to be understood that The SENTENCE is not the same as any sentence of that form because the same proposition may be proposed in any number of sentences or propositions. Logical tautologies arise because we think of all reasoning as being a computation and believe that to have negation one has to have a proposition to negate.

Accordingly all logical operations depend upon conjunction (a point upheld by all empiricists) and thus any number of conjuncts can be strung together, this concatenation of symbols being necessarily true irrespective of which variables are used.

It is only by binding the variables that some sense to this process can be achieved.

However binding the variables by predication only binds a particular to a particular, i.e. a part to a part, and indeed that part may well be identical to another counterpart yet because $Rx \,\&\, Rx \,\&\, Rx \,\&\, Rx$ constitute a non-differentiable (tautologous) relationship - i.e. we cannot tell which Rx we are talking about (unless we bind it) then without objects to bind the variables we simply go on repeating 'The brick is red and the brick is red and the brick is red and the brick is red'.

The logical constants which bind the variables are the universal and particular constants, $\forall$ & F.

However without conjunction an atomic proposition cannot be a tautology, i.e. The brick is red, subject and predicate = one proposition = one atomic proposition = the simple (a particular example of a simple).

Given all the 'simples' we can construct a whole universe, which given all propositions (the truth or falsity of which is and cannot be relevant because the main connective is ampersand) verifiable, by science, lead to the world - the one true and real world.

Clearly the world is the sum of its parts, but the parts can only be added together using a logical constant.

Wittgenstein is claiming that once we have mixed the oils and pigments and transferred our pictures (propositions) as individual facts (pointillism) - (atomic facts) onto the canvas (structure) we build up a totality of facts, i.e. the world and the oils dry out and fall out of view or drop out of the meaning.

This would indeed be true in a very restricted analysis of colour itself, i.e. of the actual sentence itself. It is not true of what is proposed nor of what the picture itself represents.

Wittgenstein has got too close to the canvas, he is only seeing a part, isolated from the whole and because he can only see two spots of blue (without any connectives) assumes that all (logical/rational) analyses are nothing, or lead to nothing, but tautologies.

The perspective by which and from which one views a proposition determines the meaning of that proposition.

The perspective, once chosen, needs to be marked, delineated or recorded, in other words, in some way 'bound' so that the original point of viewing may be returned to.

For this purpose at least two co-ordinates are required but these co-ordinates only indicate one's position relative to the 'self' in a single plane, they do not give the relative distance from the object one is viewing.

With these points in mind one may now read through the Tractatus and analyse the main contention of this work, that is, that the logical constants do not refer and that like a pointillist picture the world is the totality of facts, points of pure colour, shades and hues (analogous to the excluded middle/third - see Carruthers, The Metaphysics of the Tractatus 1990).

Note: An analogy must be chosen that removes the confusion between bivalence, biconditional and tautology.

This pointillism removes or bypasses the excluded middle ($pv \sim p$), i.e. blue $v \sim$ blue cannot arise, i.e. need not be verified as p, is blue, is apodictic - (i.e. exists in both, any, all worlds as a fact). Bivalence is avoided because the truth value of 'is blue' is true irrespective of the 'molecular' result of conjunction, i.e. blue +/& yellow = green, i.e. the molecular fact is analysable into two atomic facts.

$x = x$, tautology, is true and in this analogy, relevant.

However $x = x$ is a semantic tautology; not a logical one. This brick (=/is the same as) this brick is not the same state of affairs as This Brick and This Brick, i.e. $x \,\&\, x$ which is logically false (TTff & TTff is false), i.e. $x \,\&\, x \neq x$.

$x = x$ is true but is tautologous*.

Wittgenstein wants something new to be stated by the conjunction of atomic facts, i.e. propositions. Yet logic cannot decide the truth of molecular facts per se: it is designed to verify the conjunction of facts not the variable facts themselves.

One may now read the Tractatus with these points in mind: one may also be aware that the analogy used, pointillism, is essentially a three-dimensional entity with a subjective fourth dimension being added by the viewer. A useful discussion upon the dynamics of colour and of physical objects in general with particular reference to Schrodinger, de Broglie, and for our purposes, Bohr's Theory of Atomic Spectra may be found in Quantum Mechanics: Encyclopaedia Britannica 1976.

An understanding of constructivism/deconstructivism, cubism and minimalism is essential if a wider interpretation of the Tractatus is to be undertaken.

The preface to the Tractatus states that the problems of philosophy arise because we, whoever 'we' includes, misunderstand the logic of our language.

Leaving aside this presumption it is obvious that the writer writes for either the converted or the 'we', the potential, and to him, prospective proselytes.

Wittgenstein states The World (1), i.e. his world.

His world is a world of true realities and these realities are in a logical space.

The key to his whole philosophy is put in 2.011, 'It is essential' he writes 'to a thing that it can be a constituent part of an atomic fact'.

This is clearly absurd.

How one may ask can a whole, i.e. complex be a part of a part?

Let us (the 'we') analyse this proposition.

We may call this proposition A.

$A = x$ (a whole variable) and p (an atomic fact).

But later we shall see that p is in fact a proposition of the subject/predicate variety.

Thus p becomes P v A v B etc. i.e. P = The brick + predicate (is red, hard, soft etc.).

$\therefore A = x \,\&\, (\beta \,\&\, r)$ but $x \,\&\, \beta r = A$ thus $A = A$ = Tautology.

The WORLD, His world is from the outset given as a tautologous one.

(* $x = x$ is only tautologous within Wittgenstein's U.D.)

All and every latter day attempt to verify and justify this position by obscure and misunderstood claims borrowed from the artistic movements of the day such as 'his' logical space being analogous to Bohr's theories or his attempt to analyse objects devoid of their logical constants with reference to minimal art (Black Square on White Ground - Kasimir Malevich, Russia 1913) - Wittgenstein, Russian front 1916 4.063 Tractatus - leave and lead to one conclusion - whereof there is nothing to discuss, then one must be silent.

The Logical Analogy:

x. is blue. *x*. is green. *x* is. yellow.
x = thing = spot.
x is a blue spot. *x* is a green spot. *x* is a yellow spot.
∴ by computation
x differentiates from *x* by colour and therefore by number sequence.
∴ $x = 1, x = 2, x = 3$.
∴ *x, y, z* in semantic and numerical sequence.

But The WORLD is *x* is blue not *x* as blue spot (11).

It is the fact that *x* has the property of being blue which is the fact.

Thus *x, y, z* are properties and the logical constants which conjoin them with the structure/ground are for Wittgenstein not relevant to the meaning of his world. They drop out of the equation.

Yet in minimalism it is demonstrated that the medium/structure ground must of necessity 'be', i.e. exist no matter how one deconstructs complex propositions.

The more they attempted to 'hide' the structure the more it became apparent hence their attempt to dye canvas directly, i.e. without any ground preparation or medium for the colour. The medium (oils) = logical constants, i.e. in this case the connective '&'.

In pointillism it is the conjunction of *x* & *y* that creates the colour - the meaning.

The conjunction is implicit because it is the spatial conjunction that gives the meaning, thus '&' as the 'and' between blue & yellow gives (=) green.

The conjunction remains as visible & ostensive as the colours themselves.

It is only when one moves into a two-dimensional relationship with the atomic facts (x + colour $\propto$) & (x + colour β) = colour γ that γ analyses into two simple constituents $\propto$ & β. $\supset \propto \vee \beta$. ($\vee \propto$).

Wittgenstein was standing far too close to his own picture of reality. He couldn't think of anything more to say because he had reduced 'our' world into unrelated simple spots of colour, the true reality of their juxtaposition only being available to those who take a broader view of the world.

Thus are simples simple?

Yes, but only if you stand too close to what you wish to see.

Is truth definable? If so how?

Truth in the subjective sense is what one believes. If one does not believe something then how can this something be truly affirmed by the individual? Some things can have an objective truth and can be true objectively but this does not necessarily mean that they are true subjectively.

Every thinking creature has beliefs and these beliefs are directed towards those objects which the creature is aware of. If it can be perceived it is an object that the subject can be subjectively aware of.

How then do these objects of awareness upon which the subject bases his beliefs attain a reality beyond simply existing, that is, how does a creature's awareness of a thing rather than some thing or thing in general come about.

It would appear self-evident that there are as many ways to define objects and their properties as there are objects themselves and the question is, 'In which form shall these definitions of objects be made?'

We as humans answer this by defining objects both individually and collectively, and subjectively and objectively.

We may define objects by private thoughts, ideas and images and then if we wish turn them into objective (that which can be perceived directly by others) realities.

Objects however possess no truths in themselves for they cannot think, they are not aware of how one thing relates to another. They are neither this nor that but what they are.

One can define and relate objective realities to other objective realities without the need to define what those realities are in themselves.

No definition is required in assessing whether or not a football is different from a brick or whether water is different from sand.

Nevertheless we may communicate such differences objectively by the use of geometric propositions which are definitions of how the objective properties of one relate to the objective properties of the other. This relationship is one of similarities and differences.

Leibniz (Logical Papers, Parkinson 1966) agrees with Hobbes with the proposition that 'everything done by our mind is a computation, by which is to be understood either the addition of a sum or the subtraction of a difference'.

De Morgan writes on similarities and differences in his book Formal Logic (1847) that the 'essential parts of all inferences consists in comparing two things with a third and finding from their agreement with a third, their agreement and difference with one another'.

In geometric comparisons the conclusions which one can make are self-evident.

However humans communicate more readily by words and gestures when together because their language is richer and more expressive. They denote by being demonstrative.

However to communicate their ideas over a space and time which is not contemporaneous with their own they have developed a written language for putting words which relate to the properties of things onto objects themselves though the objects upon which they put these written words are supposed to be neutral.

However any devised and artificial system which uses abstract relationships between objects and then comparing those abstract relationships by turning them into objective realities is in danger of allowing a subjective interpretation of the objects themselves rather than the relationships that the objects refer to.

The words themselves as objects have no reality because objects possess no truths in themselves.

They symbolise beliefs or refer to third-person beliefs but they cannot as objects state relationships between themselves directly. If one begins to interpret the objects themselves as referring to themselves directly then one ends up with a meaningless object such as 'This sentence does not contain seven words'. It is not even a paradox.

A paradox is the ability to believe or to hold two or more incongruous or inconsistent concepts at the same time, i.e. two or more subjective beliefs.

The above sentence refers to itself as a sentence. It isn't. It's an object, i.e.
'This object does not contain seven words'.
Which is true. Objects do not contain any number of words.

One may contend that semantically closed languages, i.e. languages that are self-referential do not in fact exist because even if they did it would have to be a subjective language, i.e. a particular language and not just any language.

Obviously the above object quoted would not contain the same number of objects in all languages.

So if one were going to define truth by a language then one would have to specify whether this language was going to be subjective or objective and further whether the language was going to be a particular language or any language.

For the purposes of this essay then we must restrict ourselves to a written language and further must restrict ourselves to the English language. One can see that a single universal definition of truth is fast receding.

Accordingly within this restricted sense of analysis of truth within a single symbolic representation of a specific nature we may make any declarative sentence we wish to. However we must suppose that to have any meaning at all, i.e. to have the possibility of being true that the proposition is an individual belief proposed and recorded as an objective reality.

Thus one may state, 'My baby has six toes.'

If this was an objective reality that could be objectively and subjectively believed by everybody because it was subjectively and objectively verifiable through everyone being and existing contemporaneously with the objective reality then no third party perspective or relativity is required.

But this would be a specific truth not a general truth and it is unlikely that all individuals can be privy to all objective realities then we require another restriction upon our definition, it must not only be in the language of the individual using it but it must also be a general definition.

Now if someone's baby has six toes then this is likely to be reported as a fact to those not in a position to establish the facts for themselves. Thus an individual objective reality (six toes) is an individual belief (subjective belief) and if it is taken from the first person and put in a third person context then it is not a true subjective belief based upon an objective fact but becomes a quotation of a statement of a belief.

Thus any correspondence theory of truth is interested in how this statement of a belief which has or is quoted relates to the objective reality upon which it is based.

Clearly everybody cannot visit the six toed baby to assign truth or falsity to the belief contained in the proposition 'that' something pertains relative to the objective reality and the belief of the proposer.

The proposer may be illiterate and/or myopic or he may be an illiterate myopic father of a six toed baby.

Attention is drawn to the problem of distinguishing between 'How to know what to believe' and 'How to know how to believe' in Propositions. Truth and falsity in Possible Worlds by Bradley and Swartz (P.11). Here they stress the distinction between a proposition that someone believes that something pertains and the confusion of knowing that the proposition in itself, as an object, is true. Thus the realist defines truth as a subjective belief which is objectified by and in the act of proposing the belief so that in a sense the truth of this belief becomes (in a limited sense) an objective property of a proposition.

But propositions are objects to which we subjectively attach properties but these properties are meta-properties and are only attached for the sake of convenience.

Pragmatists would make the proposition true or false in itself if this should prove useful or convenient.

It will be understood from the above that when a belief moves from a first person perspective to a third person perspective then the proposer of the belief is quoted as a propositional belief or attitude, *x* believes that *y* has six toes or simply the quote '*y* has six toes'.

Now we have seen that objective realities are neither true nor false in themselves but propositions relating to beliefs regarding objective realities may be questioned by 3rd parties.

But 3rd parties cannot reasonably question or know about specific and individual beliefs.

Therefore the beliefs that 3rd parties must address are general in nature and objectively verifiable. However at best these beliefs can only be inductively justified.

So another condition that appears necessary if one is going to establish a semantic definition of truth is that the definition be not only in the language of the proposer and that it should be a general definition applicable to general propositions but that it is an existential definition and though general, not universal, i.e. there is at least one, maybe more possibly all.

The first problem then is to generalise over a generality. The next is to introduce an independent perspective to assess that generality to see how it compares with generalities in general.

Obviously there are two ways to generalise a generality. Tarski, in his 'Semantic Conception of Truth' in Philosophy of Language (Hamish 1977) uses both in the form of a bi-conditional, i.e. he subjectifies an objectified proposition into a 'sentence' and then states that whatever belief is contained by that sentence is true if there is an objective reality to which it refers or can refer by inductive justification.

Thus 'Snow is white' ≡ Snow is white.
(Proposition that) Sentence T = Tarski's subjective.

Clearly the truth conditions for a bi-conditional are either both true then true or both false then true, i.e. the truth conditions rest upon either or neither not one of this and one of the other.

Clearly snow is not always white but generally is. However the bi-conditional allows that both the quote and the sentence could be false, thus I could state the belief that 'Snow is black' because I live on a volcanic island and the first time it snowed the snow was black (or red or yellow).

Accordingly any general definition of truth must include the negation of a proposition as not constituting a contradiction of beliefs or objects but that it simply constitutes a difference or clash of perspectives, usually between objective and subjective beliefs.

Tarski makes great use of an apparent contradiction on page 543 of Meaning and Truth yet completely fails to differentiate between objects and properties of objects.

Leibniz stated that if one thing is identical with another then what is true of one must be true of the other yet if they are identical then they must be one and the same thing.

Clearly the Morning Star and the Evening Star are the same thing, i.e. the same object but objects in themselves have no realities or truths so if the object is not identical in all

respects then it is not the same thing from a subjective belief perspective as to the properties of that thing. Thus the Morning Star and the Evening Star are the same object in themselves but identicals have no difference and the Morning Star and Evening Star have, one appears to have morning properties and the other evening properties thus the belief in those properties of the objective reality is valid.

Tarski proceeds along the line proposed by De Morgan (1847) and others in which he infers a definition of truth 'by comparing two things with a third'. (Page 8 Formal Logic)

However even at this stage it is clear that his 'definition of truth' is going to have an exceptionally restricted use within philosophy in general.

What then are Tarski's beliefs and intentions?

He writes (Chap. 18, Semantic Conception of Truth P.537 →) that if a definition of truth based upon the ideas that words generate within us should prove impossible then '....it would be difficult to bring (semantics) into harmony with the postulates of the unity of science of of (sic) physicalism'. (Philosophy of Long, Hamish 1977). Further 'for some people metaphysics is a general theory of objects....' but that metaphysics has '....hardly any connection with semantics'.

Tarski states that he has heard it remarked that a 'final definition of truth has nothing to do with philosophical truth', but as he does not know what philosophical truths are supposed to be we must excuse him for 'discussing this point any longer'.

Does Tarski, as Field suggests, not simply reduce the notion of truth to other semantic notions.

No. One may contend that Tarski and his followers who attempt to construct any definition of truth, let alone a semantic one, should attempt to discover what philosophical truths are supposed to be before attempting to define them by definition.

"And when old miracles grow stale
Jugglers will still the art pursue
And entertain the world with new." Charles Churchill
The Ghost

This work begins by defining impossible:
this being to the writer a temporal concept with regard to what age the thinker makes his belief statements. What was once thought not possible, for instance space travel is now a fact, though one may be sure that to some the news has not yet arrived.

To analyse the difference between possible and not possible one may use the ideas of the Ancients as commented upon by Averroes* as to their atomic theory of matter. The example given is that of the mustard seed which in theory could be divided into a thousand parts - though no one could (at that time) actually do it - yet "this lack of possibility so to divide it would not render inconceivable the very nature of the possibility...."

Thus possible and impossible are in this sense relative to what can be done in reality at a particular time. This notion is separate from logical possibility which is concerned with contradictions (A & ~ A etc. - see Leibniz logical papers Oxford 1966 Pgs. 77 & 55).

The possible and impossible are concepts which are also dependent upon how the language used in defining those terms relates to itself.
In his introduction to Aristotle 'The Nicomacheon Ethics' Joachim states there to be three species of theoretical sciences - these being mathematics, the physical sciences and theology - these being differentiated by the 'nature of their subject matter'. Herein may be the key to removing some of the contentious issues regarding the phrase 'It is impossible'.

What may be mathematically impossible, for instance finding an exact value for pi is readily done 'physically', i.e. in reality and in theology it is of no consequence - thus in one paradigm, justified, verified and expressed in the language essential to and commensurate with that paradigm, what may be of importance may be of no significance in another. Worse still is the possibility of being unable to express significant and fundamental principles necessary for belief in the rationality of whole belief system because the languages used are subject specific and to a great extent incommensurable.

In light of the above 'possible' or 'probable' and 'improbable' are not taken in their mathematical sense but in their commonly accepted sense of believable or unbelievable.

Clearly being possible does not imply being probable.

However to be probable it must be possible.

To be believable does not mean it is believed only that it is possible to believe.

Accordingly 'unbelievable' in the natural sense (& in Agnosticism) means that it is not believed even though it is possible to believe, either because of lack of evidence or

*Averroes S. Kurland, Cambridge, USA, 1958, page 11.

faith. In an absolute sense, as in Atheism it is not believed because in the context given (the fundamental requirement being a belief in God) it is inconceivable.

In a universal sense, unbelievable means not believed though believable and in the particular sense it means that $\exists x$ a particular event being believed is dependent upon its probability. Thus event $\propto$ - men in space is now an almost universal concept though β men on Pluto is a particular concept - believable because possible yet not believed because improbable (even if 'shows' on T.V.).

Accordingly to avoid the jugglers pursuing their art to entertain the world with their daily claims of 'new miracles' - that is, to avoid particular examples under a general all inclusive heading such as the 'Miracles of Modern Science' - one may be justified in choosing an event which is claimed to be an everyday occurrence though miraculous each and every time.

As such the belief in Transubstantiation fulfils the inductivists dream - it is particular to a time and place, yet never alters and further never will - it is the complete induction, with every particular event subscribing to a universal belief.

Hume appears to have been annoyed by this particular universal belief and appears to believe that religions are founded upon miracles (Bk. III Sect. II Pt. I Treatise of Human Nature) and further that 'Nature' be taken as being in opposition to the 'rare and unusual' and thus not to include the rare and unusual.

What about the birth and death of stars, once thought to be immutable and fixed in crystal spheres, which have become regularly observed (and observable thus more believable) events in the life of galaxies?

What about his claim that religion is founded upon Miracles? One cannot found a universal faith upon disparate events.

As Arnauld points out in his 'Art of Thinking' (1683 Pt. II) it is not the name of a 'thing' that causes problems but if the name contains relative clauses which go beyond what one is prepared to believe can be determined by that name then even the original idea may be called into question. Thus the idea of God is linked with the idea that he created men to know him and to love him. This link forms the basis of the Catholic Church.

The basis of the Universal Church is certainly not events which go against the universalised observed regularities of and in nature - they simply did not exist to a sufficient and believable degree of exactitude two thousand years ago.

How one is to know, love and serve God is the business of Religion and it is the formalised belief systems within religion which decides what is to be considered a miracle. Is then one's faith in the Church and any events which it declares to be miraculous to depend upon simple unreasoned belief?

D. Ross writing on Plato's Theory of Ideas (P.124 Oxford 1961) retells of the distinction held between opinions and reasoned opinions - the former believed to arise by persuasion, the latter by teaching.

Can one be persuaded to believe the impossible, i.e. the unbelievable? Clearly most of the world's trade depends upon persuasion - persuading consumers to purchase non-essential items or to make outlandish claims for products which are readily purchased in the belief that one's life will be enriched, changed or altered for the better - yet people in general do not think they are being irrational in their acting upon the flimsiest of reasons. Free trade means free choice.

Freedom to choose one's religious beliefs is founded upon a universally accepted tenet of the meaning of freedom - thus the choice is rational - yet does what one chooses to believe in need to be rational in itself?

Herein lies the inductive difference between universal faiths and sectarianism. A universal faith is in accord with universally observed principles of a general nature to which miracles are only a particular and subordinate part. The religious sects who follow particular parts of a universal nature, such as interplanetary effects and phenomenon, are by their very structure doomed to insignificance within a Catholic Church.

Hume rages against Roman Catholicism for reasons which will become evident later.

At this point one must make a careful distinction between ideas themselves and the origin of those ideas. Certain terms used within theological discussions are decidedly unhelpful.

P.N. Smith writing in an Article Miracles (Flew & McIntyre - New Essays in Theology P. 243) against a certain Mr. Lunn uses the terms 'natural' and 'supernatural' which leads him into an unnecessary defence and several pages of explicating the difference. The above terms mislead because they are irrelevant for once the source of those beliefs, whether classed as natural or unnatural, is established then we are in the realm of the intellect judging the merits of divers ideas - not their source. Immediately one concentrates solely upon the source of our ideas one enters a minefield of inductively deduced probabilities concerning not what should be believed but what can be believed upon the available statistical evidence.

Given the alleged theory ladeness of evidence, the assumed need to have concepts a priori the investigation, in order to be able to understand what to look for, thus implies one will know what it looks like when and if one finds it - assuming one is looking in the right place.

However evidence can only be theory laden if one is to decide what <u>is</u> to be the case. One may contend that in religious issues what <u>is</u> to be the case was settled and finalised two millennia ago. What evidence is there today for the above statement?

Of J. S. Mills four methods of inductive reasoning the one that concerns us here is usually referred to as concomitant inductive probabilities based upon observed events, the cause and effect principle so that if x does $y \supset z$.

All miracles are of this basic form: If x (God, Man or anyone) does y (the event under a description) then z (an observed result).

Clearly it is the resultant $\mathcal{Z}$, its possibility, that is at issue in this essay. It is $\mathcal{Z}$ and its relative clauses that form the belief or disbelief. If $\mathcal{Z}$ is pre-determined to be what it is then what evidence is the form of concomitant inductively observed phenomena have we to believe that $\mathcal{Z}$ (in our case that particular part of y (the event) that is denied). That particular part of y (the mass) is $y①$ - the Transubstantiation. Thus belief is not concerned with x or y (for they are acts in reality) but upon the act which produces $\mathcal{Z}$. The belief is concerned with the point of transition between one state of affairs and another.

The church claims a substantive claim, a change is in the substance - not in the appearance.

It is of no matter whether it is a natural or unnatural cause that engenders x & $/v\, y$, it is solely concerned with from $\rightarrow$ to $\hookrightarrow$ a substantive change in $\mathcal{Z}$.

Mill agrees with the rational belief that Hume is off the mark by belief in a complete inductive justification being the only credible method of verifying a belief. A complete inductive justification is deductive and thus implies that the conclusion says no more than is contained in the premises - irrespective of whether what is in the premises is real or imaginary. (This is why there would be no need to believe in God if one could deduce for oneself his existence because it would be deductively self-evident - that is every observable event possible confirms his existence. We would be induced to believe upon the sheer weight of evidence.)

To Mill if x does $y \supset \mathcal{Z}$ consistently applies then $x + y = \mathcal{Z}$ becomes a law of nature.

Yet for this to be so, i.e. a natural law, it must be true of anybody and everybody - anyone could and can be x - and all must be capable of doing y; and if the inductive evidence is to be believed $\mathcal{Z}$ must, by the laws of probability, occur. This is the basis of scientific enquiry and justification, that the whole event A (x, y & $\mathcal{Z}$) can be repeated anywhere, at any time with the same result.

"If these observations or experiments have been repeated so often, and by so many persons, as to exclude all supposition of error in the observer, a law of nature is established."

(J.S. Mill Logic Chpt. XXV ¶2)

Yet do these observers inductively outweigh those who observe the universal faith? How many times has mass been celebrated by countless people before countless priests producing countless religious experiences?

Can we not claim by Mill's method this to constitute a law of nature?

Wherein, then, lies the unnatural act?

It is a law of nature that Man desires to experience a communication not only with his fellow Man but also with the universal manifestation of his spirit and the absolute ideals encapsulated within a general concept known as God.

Unfortunately Mill misunderstands chance and confuses probability with possibility. His premises are based upon rigid mathematically known facts, such as his dice, in which their numerical relationships are known in advance.

However one may contend that God cannot be known a priori to any event - he cannot be otherwise that what he is - thus no matter how many times we throw the dice, if they represent God's acts towards us they must always turn up trumps, i.e. beneficent.

One cannot induce God to act otherwise.

One may well leave the last word to De Morgan who writing on logic and probability in 1847 noted:-

"The most difficult inquiry which anyone can propose to himself is to find out what anything is: in all probability we do not know what we are talking about when we ask such a question."

Messrs Hume and Mill please take note.

Essay (3) Can I be directly aware of a table, or only the appearance of a table?

Does the above statement imply only subjective awareness of a table or can an individual's awareness of 'physical' objects be shown to imply that other individuals are able to share the same awareness?

What does appearance mean? Are mental images caused by the physical process of perceiving real objects? and why refer to objects in both the definite and indefinite mode of grammar, that is from 'a' table to 'the' table?

This essay is written from the view that objects cannot be perceived for what they truly are by an individual who has no prior knowledge of how they came to be and thus they can never be truly known or recognised with any degree of certainty.

It is for these reasons that knowledge is taken as a whole concept, undivided into 'kinds' of knowing and thus such divisions into how to do something, and knowing about something as to what is, where it is or who it is, is not relevant to this discussion. Knowledge therefore is regarded in the essay as the ability to recognise things for what they are. Problems which may arise through the use of retrospective 'knowing' are avoided by regarding all occurrences to be in the present tense and the possibility of predicting what may or will happen in the future is disregarded as meaningless to the arguments propounded in this work.

Personal pronouns are avoided and the question is rephrased in the general terms of:-

Can one be directly aware (know) their table, or can they only be aware, or know, the appearance of their table? This essay also denies the contention that it would take too long, as Descartes would have it, to examine one's opinions individually for it is proposed that in this case the specific of knowing the table can be extended to knowing all tables and that the knowing of one object, or the process of getting to know one object, may reasonably be extended to knowing all objects.

This discussion therefore begins with the idea of constructing an object for a particular purpose, assessing that object and asking whether the original interpretation of the concept of 'what' object should appear to us, that is 'how' we are to recognise it, either directly without further interpretation or indirectly by abstracting what we see, feel, hear and touch into a symbolic interpretation of reality.

Objects in the external world, that is, external to our organs of assigning existence to them in human terms, are, with the exception of very small particles, unable to be assimilated by us. Clearly to perceive objects, they must be perceived, as in the case of a table, in a very much reduced form, and possibly in an idealised way.

To fit all that we can see, from a table to the universe within our very limited heads, relative scale reduction of that which is perceived or merely seen must be of an enormous magnitude. Thus we begin by not knowing what size, shape, colour etc. anything is in

another reality for being one species we have no other species to tell us (even if they could). We must therefore interpret for ourselves and initially we form an idea of an object that we may find useful (a table) and subsequently decide what its general shape and structure will be. The imagined object is then constructed using mental dimensions and appearances translated into physical dimensions and appearances. These qualities are predetermined by mental processes and do not exist of themselves for all objects. Sun, moon or stones do not know they exist and are not aware of themselves or anything else. They may have properties relevant to Man but Man has no properties relevant to them.

The large scale physical interpretation of an idea, in this case a table, into a physical reality means that one may be said to know the table because one would recognise the table as their table, a personal possession which is delineated from all other tables and objects and is recognised for what it is. (This delineation is the basis of perception and is of critical importance in knowing or recognising objects, e.g. in painting and drawing how is one object recognised and separated from another?) Having obtained to the best of our ability an object that we recognise as our table, 'the' table how are we to be aware that it is our table?

We can measure it with touch, we may feel it, judge its size and weight, its surface texture and its shape and we can discover its disposition to other objects and its position in space and time relative to our movements, particularly important if you are blind. Insects, dogs, other people and creatures of all sorts will be aware of the table but will interpret it in different ways because to them it is 'a' table not 'the' table and like a cow in a field looking at a tractor they will be aware of something without the necessity of knowing or recognising that something. For instance if we find a block of rubber with four metal rods sticking out of it we can see it, feel it and we can think about it but we do not necessarily know or recognise it. We can interpret it into a usable and viable idea suitably reduced into a mental image capable of being moved around and stored in the head but we may only know it or recognise it for what it is; something unusual and unknown. If however this unknown object was part of a machine that we were familiar with it may well be instantly recognised and known for what it is and its appropriate name. Thus with all objects we can know some and be totally ignorant of others - we can be directly aware of our table and yet indirectly aware of other tables.

Television shows us things we could never see directly, how could we? They are of a different colour, size and relativity to what they actually are. They have been transposed into electromagnetic forms and regenerated into two-dimensional images that are recognisable, understandable and translatable because they show no more than what we can already recognise, understand and translate though they do it in an impersonal and general way. However these images lack a certain type of reality and credence for being general and non-specific, so much so that what may be familiar in daily life are unrecognisable when transposed and reduced in size. However in this instance we can assume that the table is there, we know what it looks like and it can only be an illusion if mankind as a whole is deluded for it possesses a tactile substantiality which all physical objects display, that is why they are called physical. They occupy a space and time that you cannot occupy and objects like tables come and go, you can make them or burn them. Obviously we cannot be directly aware of a table, the table or any object in its actual size or form other than physically - all mental objects must be interpretations to fit them in, mix them around, compose or discard them - all within a finite and limited space.

To ask if you can be directly aware of a physical object through the mind is absurd just as it would be to ask if you could paint an idea blue, or move it next to the piano. Russell and Descartes approach the analysis of exterior objects by thinking about thinking of such objects, that is, by being aware of awareness. This confusion between cognisance, cognition and cogitation can easily lead to the conclusion that objects depend on thought instead of thoughts depending upon objects. We think and are aware of our awareness yet is this an advantage to the process of thinking?

Thinking about the process of thinking about an exterior object is simply not possible, and just as you cannot tie your shoelaces whilst you are walking you will have difficulty answering a question that cannot be answered directly by mental reasoning.

Thus the question, 'Can I be directly.....' could be read, in the light of the above arguments as, 'Can I be directly aware of the table I recognise or only of one aspect of the table?' This implies what we know subconsciously and which has been formalised in laws etc. for if asked to identify an object we can only do so by the object being known to us by and through several aspects and not just one, thus this essay takes 'aware' to imply cognisance and cognisance to imply knowing.

If however the question 'awareness', in the sense of seeing and the process of cognition goes no further, then our awareness will be direct for it will not reach the stage of interpretation and understanding. For example what may be composed of colour and delineation in a two-dimensional format, for instance a picture in a book, can be seen for what it is, a picture, and no more - or we may dwell upon it, recognise and interpret the image and thus we may be said to have a direct effect caused by an indirect affect. The interpretation is the indirect or intermediary stage between recognising and understanding, just as a television camera sees, transmits indirectly and displays directly. One may therefore conclude that one may be directly aware of a table and directly aware of its appearance.

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"Things in themselves: Things by themselves & Things represented by ourselves."

"If we were to admit external objects to be things by themselves, it would be simply impossible to understand how we can arrive at a knowledge of their reality outside us, considering that we always depend on representations which are inside us."

The above, and somewhat long, quotation is taken from page no. 307 of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Muller 1925 by MacMillan). Upon this and within the next paragraph is contained what may be claimed to be the whole principle, and the reason for, the above critical analysis upon the dichotomy that naturally arises between pure idealism and pure materialism.

Kant refers to these as on the one side pneumatism and on the other materialism.

Accordingly this essay concerns itself solely with the fundamental propositions as expounded in this section of Kant's work and thus it discusses issues which can only arise if one keeps within a clearly defined universe of discourse centering upon what may be said and classified as being, both representationally and objectively, as constituting the difference between the subjective interpretation of a 'thing' and an objective interpretation of a 'thing' either in *itself or *by itself.

No extrapolations will be attempted other than those thought by Kant to naturally follow from such an apodictic starting point as that we, i.e. all rational humans, represent the world in terms of space and of time.

*To start one needs to ask, 'Can a "thing-in-itself" be separated from a "thing by itself".'

That is, as Chesterton puts it, we need 'an ideal in our minds with which to test all realities' and the equally true converse that we need 'a reality with which to test ideals' (Simmons and the Social Tie).

The reality which is chosen to test Kant's transcendental idealism needs to be an everyday commonplace object which possesses both form (as rigid as possible) and matter (as dense as possible). It requires both obvious and easily separated primary and secondary qualities (i.e. the difference between necessary properties - to be what it is, and contingent properties, i.e. to be as it is - as per Locke's understanding).

It needs to have common references by which it is identified both in terms of what it is and what it does so that no disputes may arise as to its function as an object in itself (what we do with it) and how we use language to define what it is to us and what it is in itself.

Thus Berkeley's objections regarding our misuse of terms which we do not fully understand need not arise.

The object chosen is a brick.

It is unlikely that the idea aroused universally within all minds will significantly differ for the object itself possesses a natural and universal form whose proportions cannot vary to any great extent without that object being defined by other common and clearly different methods of naming.

A brick, therefore, by itself, as an object to be represented is clearly not the same as a brick whose objective properties in themselves, i.e. separated from the object are to be represented.

As Aristotle pointed out that which comes first to the mind is the whole object for as such we cannot see parts without first seeing the whole. Parmenides saw that this was axiomatic and thus asked why bother dividing the whole into parts. Thus for us it is axiomatic that we see the 'whole' brick but that we do not and cannot see it all at once. Accordingly we use reason and logic to assemble our representation of the brick much in the style of adding one particular aspect of an object with another so that our representation resembles or is analogous to a 'collage of ideas'.

Leibniz agrees with Hobbes in the belief that 'everything done by our mind is a computation' (P.3 logical papers) and this is meant as either the addition of a whole or the subtraction of a part.

Though he states this to be the addition of a sum or the subtraction of a difference we may reasonably infer that whereas real objects may be incomplete it is apodictic that ideas must be whole and complete in themselves even if the content of these ideas is/are about incomplete parts of wholes.

What is in dispute here is whether or not we can have a whole and necessarily complete in all aspects and detail idea of a whole and necessarily complete object, in this case a brick.

Before proceeding it must be clearly understood that we are dealing with and talking about objects by utilising our intellects. We are therefore indulging in an intellectual exercise.

Descartes, Hume, Berkeley, Kant and all the major philosophers have never doubted this nor in the objective reality of objects in themselves. Descartes warns us in his preface that he is about to embark upon a self-indulgent intellectual exercise and that we may follow his rules for the natural intelligence or adopt our own methods of gaining self-awareness as to what is necessary to avoid undue scepticism.

Berkeley notes that the greater part of Mankind accept what is as it is and seek, nor feel, anything wanting or lacking in how things appear to them.

Hume's whole thesis is dependent upon an external objective world upon which the senses may operate for he realises that without objective realities the whole purpose of his writings in a treatise of Human Nature, i.e. to discuss how we reason from cause and effect, would be invalidated.

We are thus agreed that there are objects in themselves, the disagreement being whether or not we can truly represent such objects to ourselves as they must necessarily be in

themselves. Accordingly we should adopt from our internal world some criteria which will and can be used for knowing if and when we have successfully represented a brick to ourselves with all those properties and qualities that a brick necessarily must possess to be what it is, that is itself and not something else, e.g. a block or an idea of a block (or brick).

As we are engaged in an intellectual investigation our terms of reference are to be defined by rigidly assigning what they are to represent in themselves.

To this end we shall take what Leibniz has defined to be integral to a term which is that it is a non-contingent existent object of the mind which relates to one thing only and conveys to us the idea and only the necessary idea necessary to think of that object.

Herein lies the crux of the matter and the whole concept behind Kant's Critique.

Kant's task is to analyse what it is that makes humans able to form impressions of objects (which clearly cannot and do not exist in the mind alone) as they are in themselves.

What then is required in terms of necessary a priori equipment so that we may interact with our environment?

To this Kant gives us no answer, stating only that the mind is receptive to being affected by objects. He is about to describe and analyse how the object known as mind functions and what it must necessarily possess by way of prior knowledge in order that it may form the sensations received into an understandable arrangement of whole and complete units upon which the understanding operates.

It is of no consequence what the mind is in terms of its physical properties. The mind is given as an ideal structure - a none-changing structure which undergoes no great or significant changes throughout its life. The mind, as an object, does not alter significantly between other minds, whether young or old, green or yellow, big or little.

The mind is portrayed as a single whole entity which will establish an intercourse with the world 'as it is' upon the mind's own terms of reference.

These terms of reference are forced upon the mind by its physical limitations, both in its matter and form.

The object we have chosen, a brick, has strict terms of reference as what it has to be in itself to be what it is. The mind, as an object, has strict terms of reference to be what it is in itself.

As one cannot objectively reconcile these two objects directly (one cannot physically fit a rigid inorganic geometric form into a soft organic non-geometric structure) we employ ideas, concepts and judgements to mediate between these two worlds.

We must transcend the physicality of the brick.

"Transcendental Philosophy is with us (as) an idea (of a science) only..." (Intro. Critique), and the Critique of Pure Reason is to fix principles (rules and directions) to assemble a whole complete superstructure upon which knowledge is to be arranged in an order and relativity according to a set of primary and a priori concepts which govern the rationality of the mind.

To Kant the first pure form of knowledge which must exist before anything at all can be represented before the understanding is a prior knowledge of space, i.e. what space looks like so that we may recognise it when we see it.

Space is a pure concept, i.e. unmediated by or through experience.

Time arises by the representation of two or more objects. It is not a thing-in-itself. It is an a priori synthesis of two or more intuitions.

"Representation, which can be produced by a single object only, is called an intuition." (Kant of Time)

Kant understands and recognises that if time is to represent the mediation between the representation of one object and another then failing more than one object one requires another variable. He must at this point introduce the 'self' as a variable in the mediation equation or he will have adopted Hume's position, i.e. that the order of objects in the world order our ideas - it matters little whether they do this directly or indirectly. If one represents before the mind an intuition named 'brick' then no matter how one persists in staring at this single physical object the only sense in which the passage of time could be seen is by an internal sense. Kant states that time has one dimension only so if the brick does not move or alter then we must or else we would be in suspended animation, i.e. in a timeless yet spatial environment.

Time, therefore, is an internal sense which senses our representations of ourselves as objects relative to representations of ourselves as objects or parts of ourselves as objects or objects which are in space but not necessarily in time, though they may be. The relationship between a fixed, stable self will be discussed later. Kant wants to keep time in a trichotomous relationship of object to object, idea to object and idea to idea and thus avoid a direct relationship between object to idea, but he finally admits that time must be '...a condition, a priori, of all phenomena whatsoever' and thus external phenomena - object to idea - are indirectly time related entities.

'Time is nothing' states Kant if we take 'external to the mind' objects 'by themselves'.

Here we may recapitulate what has been necessarily established under Kant's assessment of how we represent objects to ourselves.

The self is an object both in space and time.

Objects, such as bricks, are spatial and time related.

A single object achieves a time related existence by being made relative to ourselves.

A plurality of objects permits the self to drop out of the equation, that is, self-awareness of the self as a time related object is removed if external objects are changing (affecting) our sensibilities so that we represent them to our minds, instead of representing the 'self' to our minds as a time related object.

Clearly stung into action by Hume's contention of metaphysics consisting of principles 'taken upon trust' and 'consequences lamely deduced from them' which have become 'a disgrace to philosophy'. Kant is hell bent on producing a methodological approach whose fundamental principles are apodictic and whose consequences are axiomatic.

The certainty is a rational certainty and is guaranteed by our a priori fixed and unvarying understanding whose representational abilities are indubitable.

Experience, for Hume, gives us a certain type of certainty, known as inductive certainty or probability.

It is, to Hume, all we really have.

Thus with Hume hypotheses may be tested empirically. However we should with Kant test his theory by asking what would happen to the self as a variable if the a priori conditions for the understanding to represent objects to itself were not as they are, were or will continue to be.

Thus β, the understanding is, according to Kant, fixed and stable within all Men and the world of internal or external objects α and β become the variables - the variable forms.

We have seen that the self (βvd) if treated as an object is variable, this being necessarily so in order that we may have any thoughts at all about a single object.

Now Kant has stated that our relationship with objects-in-themselves is either by analogy or by analysis (i.e. defining the variables that constitute a whole).

We shall fix the variables firstly by analogy and examine the result. The idea is to try and demonstrate that if space and time are removed by removing our perception of objects, which although present infinite numbers cannot be represented by the subject's senses to the understanding because the subject is deprived of matter and form, then nothing will be subjectively perceptible, neither space nor time, yet to an observer the whole will be readily understood.

One may therefore imagine that one is immersed in an ocean of warm whitewash of a thick and creamy texture. The ocean is limitless but light penetrates equally in all directions. One of the unfortunate consequences of this immersion is that we become as white as the whitewash.

What do we see?

If all the creatures which inhabit this world are white would we see the fish that swim not an inch away from our nose?

We have removed the objects yet space is not nothing. It transcends the subject and becomes the predicate.

Remembering that the understanding should be (and if Kant is right, it is) pure, then fixing x and y should make the conjunction of $(x) + (y)$ pure (i.e. $x \equiv y$ i.e. $x = x$) and not a 'bastard of the imagination fathered by experience' (Preface - Prolegomena). But this pure understanding does not depend upon space and time for these have been removed. It may well be that Kant has got things back to front.

Is it not possible that it is the secondary qualities which make 'things in themselves' what they are?, i.e. it is their a priori properties or more correctly their a priori accidental and contingent properties that affords 'us' the ability to represent them before the understanding?

What then of our brick analogy. How should one analyse this concept?

We shall use Kant's notions of wholes and parts as expounded in section one of his Inaugural Dissertation. He states that a part of a whole is simpler than the whole and in fact infers that the part, as a thing in itself, is simple.

By simple he means without subject and predicate, i.e. either predicate alone or subject alone, i.e. no logical constants. Thus with our brick we shall analyse it only, for if we reversed the idea and went from idea $\rightarrow$ object we would have a synthesis of parts diversely gathered and formed into a composite, a pottage of pre-established beliefs and representations of how it is: for if the brick were suddenly to appear before us in the ocean of whitewash we would immediately know it would be something but could not know what it was other than simply stating its predication.

The form is thus given, its matter (material) is not.

If therefore we can establish that it is the material that matters and not the form we can justly state that as material substances can be analysed into non-material parts, i.e. simples which as elements possess no spatial relativity, then space is neither empty nor full and that a false division of it (by the understanding, based upon preconceived ideas of what is a priori and what is a posteriori) into a 'whole', existent as one unitary dimension of our reality needs to be questioned.

The name brick applies to its form.

The material itself is clay. We may analyse it as aluminium and iron oxides and silicates. Bricks are normally red because they contain iron oxides.

Our blood is red because it contains iron oxide, in fact our blood is little more than rusty water.

Yet science tells us, and so does our reason, that if red is not absorbed, but yellow and blue are, then the object in itself and by itself is green though naturally we see it as red - the by-product of its own structural absorbance of certain wavelengths.

However a thing by itself is like a lump of coal in a coal mine in the dark. Space and time have nothing to do with ordering objects before the mind for such a belief only arises because we have ordered ourselves into an order that has to understand the world - the world need not understand us. Kant has based this understanding upon space and time, because he believes that objects actually exist as objective, but unknowable, realities. But for his thesis the world could just as easily be composed of numbers or geometric lines. He has no need of reality to prove his point for all he requires is a fixed starting point from which viewpoint all other things are understood, represented and judged and one or two variables floating around in space.

It is only in his later writings on the metaphysical foundations of natural science that Kant begins to realise that space itself and the forces within it may hold the key as to how we come to represent the world to ourselves.

He realises that objects in themselves possess distinct quantities which have the accidental ability or potential to create the sense of a quality within us. The unique ability of humans to convert quantities into qualities gives us our understanding - space and time are only by products of this process.

Kant concludes his final work:
"And so ends the metaphysical doctrine of body with the empty and therefore with the inconceivable, wherein this doctrine has the same fate as all other attempts of reason when, in going back to principles, it aspires to the first causes of things."

Kant should have questioned his apodictic certainty that space is indeed empty or that emptiness is indeed inconceivable.

We have seen how one may remove space or time. Kant states if space $\supset$ time, but without objects $\supset$ no space and thus no time.

We have seen that he makes the self a variable, he makes reason fixed and he makes objects oscillate between representational objects and things in themselves, thus adding the notion of change thus time. The self however is a variable and thus can create time by becoming the required third man, i.e. object (singular), reason and self instead of object, object, reason ($\supset$ judgement).

We can analyse the claims made in his critique two ways. One is to use analogous relationships between his variables and variables of our own. By fixing one or the other or both we can test his hypothesis of space $\supset$ time and its corollary no time because no objects and thus no space.

But we require another method of analysis.

Kant would object that space = the subjective condition upon which the 'self' intuits objects.

He has us no matter which way we turn.

However if we use the twin approach and liken what we are in ourselves and demonstrate that not only is what we are composed of able to pass through us, out of us, into us and exist in outside objects such as bricks which it passes into and out of with ease this will question the objective reality of his 'us' and 'them' stance.

We have chosen water to be the medium that knows no bounds and if we further have water plus a single predicate, 'is white', we put severe pressure upon Kant's analysis of the rôle of space and thus time.

The other branch of this forked analysis was to question the validity of substance and form.

A substantial, i.e. material form may be reduced both in itself and as a representation into insensible elementary particles, which fill a finite space. Accordingly if one had a container the size of Birmingham 'full' of brick dust we can establish an analogy between what can be seen under one set of conditions and what can be seen under another.

Space and time have nothing to do with this.

We can still represent these ideas to ourselves, we can still have knowledge of the brick's existence.

To Kant it was the light of reason that was a priori all possible experiences.

He was and is wrong.

We should establish our metaphysics and logic upon the Trichotomous relationships which develop when we unite the light of reason with the light of experience within that light which illuminates the self as a being of and in the world - that world which to Kant was the synthesis of all knowledge which was only possible because of Pure Reason.

Like Thales before him, who states 'All is Water', without any empirical input whatsoever his thesis is doomed. However, not to be outdone, one may justifiably claim that if Kant had stated 'All is Light' he would have been nearer the mark.

Is Wittgenstein's private language argument successful?
Does it refute the Cartesian picture of mind?

Introduction

By Wittgenstein's own admission that which is referred to as a private language argument can be no more than an interpretation of remarks which are tolerable in so far as they conceptualised his thoughts into a publicly accessible form. The form is a combination of synthesis and analysis of first and third person perspectives though the order of reasoning follows no set rules or patterns and the game played appears mostly concerned with word association.

Accordingly this essay takes the liberty of not pre-supposing what is meant by the 'private language argument'. The conclusion drawn is based upon what may be reasonably inferred by reading Wittgenstein directly and will avoid 'assertions on obscure matters' which, ultimately, must rest for their justification upon 'obscure propositions' (Descartes Rule 3).

"Following a rule is a general practice and one
cannot follow a rule privately" (Wittgenstein dictum).

Hintikka and Provence writing on privacy and publicity (in the 2nd internat. Wittgenstein symposium 1978) state that the received view is that 'In his late philosophy Wittgenstein gave up all attempts to show how language is tied to reality in any direct way' (P.353).

They discuss 'vertical links' between words and objects and 'horizontal links' between different moves in language games. Apparently it is the vertical links which need emphasising so that if there was a time when Wittgenstein was reticent about the relationship between words and things then it was not in 'his later period but (at) the time of Tractatus'.

Thus does one approach Wittgenstein's remarks concerning language from a comparison between how private experiences are made public (horizontal links in so far as words are the medium) or from an objective analysis of how concepts of objects relate to the objects themselves (vertical links) or a combination of both?

Hintikka and Provence believe that the received view that Wittgenstein tells us 'next to nothing' about the links between language and reality (the world of objects) has gained popularity because of the difficulty of varying that relationship because 'all languages presuppose an already existent set of relationships', i.e. one cannot analyse the process by using the process itself.

Accordingly to analyse words one analyses their meaning by learning the associated game, (P.355) '- one learns them in living the associated forms of life'.

The horizontal moves, the words used to describe words, are all that can be taught - we cannot teach what the objective reality 'feels' like, i.e. what a personally experienced object feels like - it is the process of joining in the game that furnishes the experience.

Wittgenstein, in his philosophical investigations (Anscombe 1994) certainly begins with the above view of language. Like Descartes (fourth medit.) the apprentice in learning the vertical links commences to 'turn his mind away from imaginable things towards objects of the intellect alone and which are totally separate from matter'. These objects which are totally separate from matter are then ideas caused by those objects.

The question is, 'Is it the relationship between ideas more important than the relationship between the idea and the objective cause of such an idea?'

If the word becomes separated from the object by what method shall we come to know its meaning?

To Descartes mind and body are distinct substances, that is, they are objects which can exist by themselves as distinct objects which are unsupported by any other object. However whereas the mind as a whole may be distinct can a word be distinct without recourse to support from an object?

Who or what then supports words?

Do other minds support words or are words subjectively supported by introspective analysis of how they refer to the self? That is does the 'I' take a first person perspective in analysing its own condition as it is only the self which can, by definition, experience self-sense sensations or does the 'I' rely on a pre-ordained publicly acceptable analysis of what the 'I' will, should or could feel?

Does, in fact, the making of any public statement based upon private experiences help to subjectify those feelings by applying a publicly acceptable meaning to and analysis of them?

Wittgenstein states the 'true by definition' proposition that sensations are private (P.I.248) as they are arrived at through the senses and since we are individuated objects by use of these senses then the senses confine the sensations to one being alone. Thus private relates to an individuated (through the senses) object. What about language?

In P.I.258 Wittgenstein uses an undefined sign to individuate a sensation, thus the sign is arbitrary and so is the choice of sensation unless of course the sensation is of such a nature as to be object specific, e.g. a toothache; it is the arbitrary symbol which would be forgotten and not the specific object that demands notice and attention.

What rules then (P.I.262) can one invoke (in a 1st person subjective analysis) to assign an individuated objective feeling a symbol that will stand in for the feeling/sensation, that is, what term or categorematic terms are required?

Wittgenstein writes (P.I.264) 'Once you know <u>what</u> the word stands for you understand it, you know its whole use'.

Yet one word does not stand for another, it stands for an object which may be called by another name. A time-table must be a time-table of some object or with some object in mind or one would have a time-table of times which would be interesting but absurd. Thus the question, 'What time does the 4.30 arrive' means not what time does the time 4.30 arrive (which arrives at 4.30) but what time does the object represented by the categorematic phrase four-thirty or 4.30 arrive.

One cannot imply, as Wittgenstein infers, that word *x* can be directly translated into word *y*.

Irrespective of how bad the memory is or how inaccurate the watch the objective reality occurs independently of such subjective conditions, i.e. the train arrives when it arrives.

One can naturally construct rules for governing one's inability to remember specific numbers and how these may correlate to an objective reality yet unless these rules were generally known and accepted they would remain private and unless they were translatable by another set of publicly accessible rules, also meaningless.

However if the individuated object was of private construction yet could be publicly displayed then no matter how indefinable and meaningless the descriptive language used to describe the object its actuality would make such attempts superfluous, for example, a statue.

This appears to be the nub of this matter.

De Morgan writes, 'An object communicates an idea; but it does not follow that every idea is communicated by an object'.

He continues (in formal logic. 1847 London) to describe (P.29/30) his horse (beetle) in the box analogy and concludes, 'There is an object because each of the twenty persons receives an idea without communicating with the other; so that there is something external to give it them.'

However when they discuss the object they do not discuss the objective reality - they discuss their received idea.

Before proceeding let us be sure of how things stand.

De Morgan states there needs to be, initially, an object to communicate the idea of that object.

Wittgenstein agrees and calls this the rudiments of language.

What then of sensations asks Wittgenstein?

Are these objects or objective realities and in which domain do they exist, private or public?

Do we wish to talk to ourselves, to other? or both?

We need not describe to ourselves how we feel but we can and do and if we wish we can to others. There are no set rules.

In Section 302 (P.I.) Wittgenstein states, 'Pain behaviour can point to a painful place - but the subject of pain is the person who gives it expression.' Thus x individuates object y and y causes x to $\mathcal{Z}$(scream?).

Accordingly an independent cause is established in which a Cartesian dualism is implied. My body hurts here (physiological cause) but the effect is here - at an independent and distinct part of the person. It is implicit that mind and body are distinct substances because if the cause is in the body then if the mind and body were one and the same object or substance then the sensation, feeling and its expression would form a single compounded occurrence which would not be subjectively analysable but would have to be a publicly felt and accessible experience to all bodies (if other bodies exist).

But we have seen that if one has an object then one also has an idea of that object. This must be so - for if all objects were identical there would only be one object and therefore only one word.

In Lycan's Mind and Cognition (P.207/205) Churchland & Feyerabend discuss 'classic' and current eliminativism, the latter stating that to defeat dualism the monist needs to 'develop his theory without recourse to existent terminology' which to some extent may be preferable (because it would be meaningless) to the former's wish that propositional attitudes follow some lawlike rules and that such rules permit such propositions to be quantified.

Thus (x) (f) (m) [((x has a mass of m) & (x suffers a net force of f))
$\supset$ (x accelerates at f/m)]

is equivalent to (x) (f) (m) [((x fears that m) & (x believes that f)
$\supset$ (x brings about f/m)].

These formulae clearly state that x fears he is overweight and x believes that if he accelerates his fat mass he will bring about the desired result.

Clearly if eliminative materialists have their day we will have to write history according to their rules, but this would mean that there would be only one universal rule, one viewpoint:-

Thus (Fy) (x) $(fx \equiv x = y)$ (see Quine Method of Logic 1978), that is, there is one and only one object of which f is true (i.e. truly predicated of).

To the eliminative materialist this would be the ultimate theoretical language; to the Solipsist it would be himself. F is any predicate and all and every individuated (private) object can claim this predicate for itself for upon which rules is this predicate to be allocated?

Accordingly if x is isolated and x predicates y with the predicate F, then isolated or not there is one and only one Fy.

Whether his language is contingently private or logically private makes no difference for whereas x can choose any f he cannot choose any y.

Any object y whether real or imaginary, private or public only exists because it can be predicated descriptively. It is assumed that in a private language this individuation is not required in an ostensive form because there is no need to individuate by descriptive predication if no other individuated thing or being exists to join in the game of repeating predicates yet if you are a dualist there is; you and your body. Thus a dualist can talk to himself whilst a monist can only, at best, have a theoretical neuroscientific experience.

How many rules then are there for classifying by predication what is to come under this rule or what comes under that rule?

Well it appears that x's private language predication can only be meaningful to others (it will always mean something to x) if the so called scientific line of enquiry is used. This basically means that the rules which apply in the game quantify the relationship between cause and effect. This is only possible by observing (using sensations) such a relationship thus some empirically verifiable event must occur independently to whatever x does.

However (see P.I.270) independent verification only justifies and verifies an inductively possible link between cause and effect - exterior analysis of internal causations of physically observable effects depend upon an object that is possible to delineate from all other possible objects for if we are one whole interconnected mass of neurons then one can only state that the whole being is causing the whole effect that the whole being experiences.

An object is that which can be delineated, separated or individualised so that it can be conceived as distinct. Wittgenstein cannot claim that because 'he' cannot individuate sensations from feelings from objective causations that others cannot do so.

If we go along this (his) monist road then $x \equiv x_1 \equiv x_2$ i.e. we are all physiologically identical, we become the eliminative monist's ideal, the clone who is environmentally determined by exterior causations alone.

This functionalist view that we are all wired the same way and thus function in some logical positivistic fashion produces the absurdity of monism or monotone monotony.

The crux of the matter must lie in whose rules we are going to use (ostensively* - not necessarily privately) and to what objects we are going to apply them (*to have meaning and universal application).

The number of different rules we can logically have appears unlimited thus we can have rules (our own or anybody else's) for inner objects, outer objects, abstract objects and even rules for the rules which rule the inner rules.

The only way of avoiding rules is to avoid using a public language. The very point of a private language is not to describe inner sensations or feelings to oneself let alone to others.

It is to avoid following anybody else's rules.

This is a sure method of not only becoming individuated but also an individual.

Wittgenstein doesn't seem to catch on to the fact that private languages (and the actions they engender) can and will defeat the very purpose of a publicly meaningful language by transposing the objects referred to under one set of rules into another. Wittgenstein believes that public and private rules are incompatible but that is only because the paradigm in which he discusses these matters is itself governed by certain and specific, one might almost say Draconian, rules based upon a mechanistic empirically dominated and justified society.

Wittgenstein writes a series of rhetorical questions each and everyone of which could be answered in as many ways as there are rules for interpreting what he states.

There are games within games within games. One is not obliged to tell other players how one is playing the game. One may ostensively be playing by 'going through the motions' yet the end and goal in sight may well be different for each and every player.

The only things that matter are the objects used within the game and the only thing that matters about the objects in the game is that they are different objects and the only thing that matters about the different objects within the game is that we can tell/describe the difference and the only rule that is employed in the game is that we use words to describe the differences.

It is not relevant what the words are - they serve only to state that *x* is not *y*.

J. McDowell in Moore's Meaning and Reference (OUP 1993) writing on Wittgensteinian rule following believes that he was against the idea that a precisely defined practice 'can be dictated by the self', this self-regulating practice 'owing no allegiance to communal action'.

McDowell then outlines Kripke's understanding of the rule following which is that rule following is a matter of personal disposition to follow certain rules. Further, how would the individual know which rule to apply in determining the meaning of an object, his example being a 'plus' sign. McDowell writes, 'There is no one fact that could constitute my having one rather than another meaning to the "plus" sign'. Well, true. One can think and do what one wishes yet the result would be pretty meaningless if one did accept the object under one set of rules, thought about it under another set, and reached a conclusion using another set.

Nevertheless one is entitled to fully support De Morgan in asserting that there is a simple objective fact that does constitute an individual attaching one specific meaning, i.e. one set of rules, rather than another to a 'plus' sign.

On page 49 of his formal logic (1847) he notes that compounding two or more ideas does not of necessity produce a product that is the same as adding them together. If, as he suggests, one states that the product of two 'plus' two 'plus' addition equals four whereas two plus two is two two or 2 + 2 + Rule A = 22 or 1 + 10 + Rule χ = 101. It is evident

that any rule of combination is possible. The public language states rules for adding numbers, not for compounding symbols.

Thus to Wittgenstein the self-determinist or rule-anarchist would produce meaningless public utterances but this position is only sustainable because Wittgenstein fails to grasp the full significance of objects and how it is the objects themselves which are the final arbiters of meaning and not language (as he uses it) or any language, irrespective of whether the language is universal, individual or private.

One or two examples will demonstrate that although at first sight it appears that it is the rules that are of paramount importance it can be shown that it is the objects used that decide the ultimate meaning and outcome of the game.

These objects may be directly or indirectly perceived, they may be described in any manner the players see fit and all the players are at liberty to call the objects any name they wish and can constantly change the name without affecting the outcome.

Suppose the game being played is called council tax or monopoly. Each player chooses any object to represent themselves, hat, shoe, marble, anything. The game proceeds according to the rules which govern the movement of objects and the final disposition of those objects is, according to the rules, that which decides who obtains all or most of the other objects.

However if all the players had to play with the same object as representing themselves, say a top-hat, then it would be impossible to state who had won for it is the difference in the objects themselves that delineates the winner. If all the top-hats ended up on Mayfair with an hotel on it, save keeping a physical 'vertical' link with your finger on the object that represents the self it is absolutely impossible to verify or justify giving an answer to the question 'Who's won' because no matter what one said it would be rendered meaningless because no one could truly know.

In this instance a private language appears almost essential in keeping track of events.

Suppose that in chess that instead of all the pawns having the same rule of objective movement each one had a different rule according to its initial position. The game is unplayable not because of the rules but because the objects themselves cannot be differentiated and individuated.

If pawns had different rules they would be different and differing objects! If the objects have the same rule then they are the same object. If the objects have different rules then they are different objects. If the objects have public rules then they are public objects and if they have private rules then they are private objects.

However De Morgan states:-
'An object communicates an idea: but it does not follow that every idea is communicated by an object.'

Precisely; and if the object does not exist then it is by a private process that it is conceptualised and actualised into an objective reality. We are free from any rules

whatsoever in making as many individuated objects as we like and calling them what we will.

In a private language an idea is communicated by a private object but it does not follow that a private language is, whether logically or contingently private, meaningless in the public domain as long as it is the objects which give words their meaning. Descartes clearly saw the dangers of applying any rule to his meditations so naturally he not only gives us his rules but also tells us to which objects we should apply his rules so that we understand his meaning.

Wittgenstein does not refute the Cartesian picture of mind nor does he establish a viable argument for or against a 'private language' - he only gives us an infinite number of variables.

Wittgenstein gives us no rules to deal with these variables. What is worse he gives us no private objective reality nor any publicly accessible object, in fact, he gives us no object at all.